philosophy of language or of mathematics, say, but always wishes to effect a particular kind of change in his readers' sensibilities which will enable them to alter their outlooks on the very nature of philosophical problems themselves as they relate to the historical and cultural contexts in which we encounter them (Ibid., 2). Yet whilst this is surely correct in regard to the philosophical problems, the cultural perspective referred to is not one that any reader would normally claim to be able to find in the context of any of Wittgenstein's treatments of specific problems in his work, e.g., the discussion of private language in § § 243 -315 of the Investigations. This leads Cahill to conclude:
But I am not convinced that an adequate story about the cultural significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be found directly or conclusively in the Investigations or in any other writings. I am much more inclined to think that this understanding has to be teased out and that what one purports to discover in any given text is best supported by using material from other sources. This is the method Because he finds no explicit remarks pertaining to the culture of his time in the Investigations, Bouveresse as Cahill sees him proceeds as if Wittgenstein's outlook on his times is absent from the book, finding in it no connection between its philosophical content and his remarks on culture.
In the same way, discussing Friedlander's book on the Tractatus, Cahill whilst not entirely rejecting the claim made in that book to the effect that, in his writings, early and late, Wittgenstein does not engage with the idea that his philosophical work occurs in a historical and cultural context, argues that 'more can and should be made of the presence of the historical and cultural context in and around Wittgenstein's writings' than Friedlander seems to assume (Ibid., 173). Cahill in effect wishes 3 to show that what is said in one context can 'throw light' on what is said in another.
This for Cahill is importantly connected to the motto, taken from Nestroy, of the Investigations itself as translated by David Stern: 'Anyway, the thing about progress is that it always seems greater than it really is'. This motto, which remains, according to Cahill, echoing Stern, to be translated for all German-English editions of the book and is absent from English only translations (Ibid., 107) -though it is now included in the latest Anscombe, Hacker, Schulte 4th edition from Blackwell (2009) -points in two directions, firstly and uncontroversially to the progression of Wittgenstein's own thinking, and secondly to a criticism of a wider concept of progress as it relates to Wittgenstein's ideas about the West. The implication is that editions of the work which have avoided including the motto have allowed its evident cultural significance to be missed or ignored.
Cahill makes play in an endnote (Ibid., 208, Endnote 3) with the idea that some readers may object to an apparent incompatibility between 'immanent' and 'contextualist' readings in making this claim, but in this context at least, this may seem unnecessarily pedantic.
In fact, the cultural significance of Wittgenstein's concern with language was accepted as early as 1966 by Maurice Drury who, remarking on the increasing number of commentaries and introductions to Wittgenstein's philosophy at that time -what would he have said about today? -echoes this idea by suggesting that 'it would be a tragedy if well-meaning commentators should make it appear that his writings were now easily assimilable into the very intellectual milieu they were largely a warning against' (Drury, as quoted Ibid., 1). G.H. von Wright in his well-known paper, 'Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times' (1977), remarks on Wittgenstein's alienation from the period in which he lived, referring to his feeling that those who professed to be his followers were not actually involved in the same spiritual endeavour as was he (von Wright, as quoted, Ibid., 4).
This 'spiritual endeavour' in which Wittgenstein is presented as being engaged, is said to be reflected in his opposition to 'the hold of the disengaged view on our thought and culture,which has a lot to do, of course, with the hegemony of institutions and practices that require and entrench a disengaged stance: science, technology, rationalized forms of production, bureaucratic administration, a civilization committed to growth, and the like'. The quote is from Charles Taylor (Ibid., 8), whom Cahill regards as a thinker who has 'grappled with the network of overarching themes concerning philosophy, religion, culture, politics, and modernity central to the conception of and motivation for this book' (Ibid., 10). His initial mention of Taylor, in fact, is closely connected with a useful comparison which Cahill wishes to make between Heidegger's explicit cultural critique in much of his later work, and with how this relates to what he has to say about 'the later Wittgenstein' (Ibid., 9). He also mentions a connection he finds between the early Heidegger and 'the early Wittgenstein', although it ought to be stressed that in making these comparisions at all, the sole aim is to throw light on our understanding of Wittgenstein as a 'philosopher of culture' whose philosophical work implicitly if not explicitly provides a critique of Western Civilisation.
It is largely because of their apparent failure to recognise this critique for what it is, that
Cahill criticises the work of a number of commentators. Ray Monk, for example, is said to focus in his biography on Wittgenstein's 'internal moral struggles', making his approach primarily psychological, whilst ignoring 'the conceptual interplay between Wittgenstein's philosophy and his views on cultural matters' (Ibid., 5). Stephen Hilmy, whilst making a connection between Wittgenstein's later work and 'cultural factors', fails because he not only reinforces the 'standard interpretation' which presents a sharp distinction between the early and later philosophy, but also ascribes to Wittgenstein 'a much more systematic, constructive view of philosophy than is Investigations, has been regularly described by many commentators in overtly theoretical terms.
Even if one is prone to accept that the term 'theory' can be used about these works to describe the development of Wittgenstein's ideas in some specific field, irrespective of the standpoint adopted on the general significance of this term for his work as a whole, Cahill nevertheless feels that he is putting his book on a rather controversial foundation by accepting a 'resolute' approach to the Tractatus and a 'therapeutic' or 'quietist' approach to the Investigations (Ibid., 6). This is closely connected to a 'fairly inchoate notion' that the assimilation of Wittgenstein's philosophy into our current intellectual mileu must be problematic, one that Cahill claims his earliest encounter with Wittgenstein produced in him (Ibid., 2). This led to his acceptance of three main ideas that inform his book, the first of which is that Wittgenstein saw it as his aim 'to reawaken a sense of wonder for what he felt was the deeply mysterious place of human life in the world' (Ibid.).
He elaborates upon this thought later on in quoting from the 'Lecture on Ethics', where it is stated that the notion of 'absolute or ethical value' is intimately connected in Wittgenstein's mind to two ideas, the first of which is his 'wonder at the existence of the world', and the second of which is 'the experience of feeling absolutely safe' (Ibid., 28). We cannot, according to Cahill, come to understand Wittgenstein's philosophical work without grasping the importance of these ideas. They lead us to conclude, as Cahill goes on to argue, that Wittgenstein's understanding of the 'ethical' involves his concern for the fate of wonder as described, 'modulated by a critique of metaphysics-cum-critique of culture' (Ibid., 3). This is mentioned in relation to the famous letter to von Ficker, about which one is bound to ask what Wittgenstein must have been thinking of, by telling a publisher intent on having a saleable commodity, that the important part of the book is the part that is not written. What can 'delimiting from within' possibly have meant to von Ficker ?
The second idea is that the task of philosophy, presumably in the most general terms, can only be carried out as a form of cultural criticism, because Wittgenstein's critical relation to Western metaphysics can only be understood in terms of his critical relation to Western modernity.
This again is clearly connected to the 'disengaged view on our thought and culture' which Taylor intimately associates with this modernity. The issue will arise again later in the book in Chapter 6 on 'The Fate of Metaphysics', where Cahill discusses what he refers to as the 'corrosive effect' of certain mythological conceptions of rationality that tend to hold captive individuals and societies that are 'beholden to them' (Ibid., 151). This suggests that these conceptions are directly connected to modernity as such, so that they need not be thought to be 'fundamentally rooted in our humanity', an idea he associates with John McDowell and Stanley Cavell. Wittgenstein was always prone to ask, in any event, whether philosophical questions as they arise for us are rooted in our particular cultural situation and in our language in that context; or do they have a more fundamental origin in our basic humanity? Here one is reminded of an idea from Anthony Kenny, that how the kinds of 'problems of the self', originating with Descartes and surely not unconnected to the 'New Science', which played an important role in Western philosophical thinking from the 17th Century onwards, simply did not arise for Aristotle and his followers, who regarded the human individual as a person amongst other persons in a social world.
The third idea that Cahill associates with Wittgenstein on culture is that from the Tractatus onwards, 'Wittgenstein believed that only a way of practicing philosophy that both avoided and undermined traditional philosophy's reliance on theory was suited to accomplishing this task' (Ibid., 2). This is badly put, largely because Wittgenstein cannot possibly have so deliberately intended to adopt the methodological strategies we discover in his work in pursuit of the particular predetermined cultural purpose that Cahill attributes to him. It would be better to say that this purpose can be shown to emerge, if indeed it can be shown to emerge at all, from a study of how his cultural concerns can throw light, as Cahill believes, on his philosophy; and vice versa. Nevertheless, this does allow Cahill to adopt a methodological strategy of his own: accepting that the Tractatus -although this remains to be proved -does embody a critique of metaphysics-cum-culture in one sense, and the Philosophical Investigations in quite another, a critique recognisably continuous with the first, one may then be able to go on to reveal how the rejection of a certain 'dogmatism' inherent in the 'early' work and connected to certain 'metaphysical' presuppositions, is integral to the development of the 'later' philosophy with its evident 'criticisms' of the Tractatus. As Cahill puts it later in the book:
The Tractatus hinders us from having precisely the relationship to language that it seeks to secure for us. If the ethical aim of the book consists in trying to lead the reader to a kind of self-understanding gained through a proper relationship to language, then this is only attainable if its method is true to the phenomenon of language. And this means that it must connect up with the many different ways that language functions in our lives (Ibid., 98).
But this of course is precisely what the Tractatus fails to achieve with its 'craving for generality' and 'contemptuous attitude towards the particular case' (Ibid., 97); and it fails to do so because it attempts to provide a 'synoptic view of what a sentence is', a view that is itself stated by Cahill to be an illusion. On a 'resolute' reading, the work's attempt to set our intellects at peace will never be satisfied, so that the author's 'ethical' intention in writing the book will remain unfulfilled because, as Cahill presents it, it is too 'intellectualist'. This is but one example of how, on a 'resolute' reading, the content of the Tractatus can be shown to be 'compatible' with a 'standard' metaphysical reading. The only differenceand it is intended to be one of crucial importance -is that whilst on the latter interpretation Wittgenstein 'really' did adhere to the metaphysical standpoints the book has traditionally been taken to espouse -'ineffable' truths which his reader can 'grasp' for himself -on a 'resolute' or 'New' reading, Wittgenstein actually 'intends' to produce in his reader an illusion of sense which the reader can gradually come to outgrow in the process of realising that Wittgenstein is 'really' talking 'nonsense'. As Cahill presents his case following, principally, Diamond and Kremer, the sentences of the Tractatus are deliberately chosen by Wittgenstein via a form of imaginative activity: by allowing his 'own imagination to wander and feel the attraction of words that he imagines others may take for the expression of profound philosophical truths', Wittgenstein seduces the reader into the belief that he has become acquainted with insights of metaphysical significance. But this act is performed in order that he can become aware that he has been duped by an illusion of sense, one to be 'overcome' in the process of 'seeing the world aright' (Ibid., 34).
This explanation occurs in Chapter 2, 'Interpreting the Tractatus', the aim of which is to help readers perhaps unfamiliar with current debate on the diverse ways of interpreting this book; albeit that Cahill has no real intention of participating in these disputes (Ibid. used to convey to us about the content of the book itself. It makes little or no sense to regard it as an account of its author's real intentions. This is not simply a matter of the historical record, although this record can, and has been used effectively by Hacker and others to throw doubt on a 'resolute' reading. It is rather that, as an author who developed his ideas in the Tractatus, it makes little sense for readers who 'understand' its content within the 'frame', to think of Wittgenstein, in the act of writing his book, to be promoting a sophisticated 'resolute' account of his own deliberations which 'undermines' itself from within. This in isolation from the 'frame', frankly seems impossible to accept.
What this means, in effect, is that if we wish to uncover this kind of reading, we are duty bound to leave the author's intentions completely out of account in the course of revealing that the 'frame' of the book as presented to us is 'consistent' with a reading of precisely this kind.
Later on in his book, Cahill indirectly provides the evidence for this way of looking at things when he refers to David Stern's account, following Glock, of a so-called 'immanent' reading of a text, a reading which leaves the author's intentions entirely out of account, and which is constrained entirely by 'what a reader can understand by looking at the text itself' (Ibid., 109). In this case, the reading is one which results from looking externally at the 'frame' in relation to the content of the book, allowing an interpreter to regard the content as pure nonsense, i.e., nonsense -as -gibberish. But to take such an evidently narrow view of Wittgenstein's work, as Cahill sees it, is to neglect how 'Wittgenstein's attempt to bring out the incoherence of the disengaged picture is of a piece with an attempt to bring out the way our rule-following practices are, as Diamond puts it, "woven into the texture of life"' (Ibid.):
Later on in this
We are supposed to see our rule-following practices as making sense within specific contexts of a form of life. But to talk of 'practice', 'custom', and 'form of life' in this way can immediately invoke other words such as 'history' and 'culture'. To become aware of ourselves as embodying rule-following practices is ipso facto to become aware of ourselves as finite creatures who are embedded in a particular historical and cultural setting (Ibid.) Well, yes of course, one is inclined to remark, a reaction which Cahill captures in his statement that in saying this he is really only describing 'the acknowledgement of a truism'.
Whether the self-understanding achieved by this acknowledgement 'can take on the feel of an earth shattering insight' is then left for the reader to judge. What Cahill once again wishes to argue is not only, following Charles Taylor, that the disengaged view we have of ourselves in the West is one of the 'central organizing myths of modernity', but also that it is endemic to Western philosophy.
Wittgenstein, in the course of successfully dissipating philosophical confusion, is directly confronting this disengaged view we have of ourselves, a point which is particularly relevant to the passages on rule-following, where he is drawing attention to 'the role in our lives' of our rule-following practices.
Whilst accepting that this is not a field in which Cahill is offering theses which can be decisively proved, many readers may be forgiven for thinking that this still leaves the cultural relevance of the philosophy hanging in the air, if only for the reason that the evidence provided is largely circumstantial. On the other hand, Cahill would surely argue that his idea about the cultural comments 'throwing light' on the philosophy, and vice versa, is not and cannot be intended to provide any definitive 'scientific' claim of the kind associated with the disengaged view he is anxious to reject.
The point is rather that if we are prepared to study the cultural comments and the philosophy in 'the right way', we will come to see that these two aspects of his thinking do allow us to participate imaginatively in his oeuvre in a way which allows his views on modernity to illuminate our grasp of the role that the philosophy plays in Wittgenstein's life. and that of the subjects of his research are situated 'within their respective historical horizons'. This leads him parochially to assume that the natives must be attempting to 'explain' the world around them in terms of a naive hypothesis, say, about the activities of their gods, when in fact, on Wittgenstein's assessment, they are expressing a feeling of 'wonder' or reverence which is integral to the intimate relationship they enjoy with the natural world in which they live. Yet Cahill invites us to understand that this is a relationship which Frazer, from his more disengaged scientific perspective, may have irretrievably lost as a consequence of his shared participation with us in the 'modernity' that is the subject of Wittgenstein's critique (Ibid., 129).
There are, however, two sides to every coin, and it is worth mentioning that whilst Frazer is undoubtedly in error here, the rituals and practices in which his natives indulge do include human sacrifice. Perhaps his tribesmen also indulge in head-hunting and cannibalism. Consequently, whilst it is true that from a strictly philosophical perspective the criticisms of Frazer are cogent, we can discern a romantic vision lurking in the background to Wittgenstein's thinking, one which reveals how the natives in their unsullied state manage to avoid becoming the victims of the prejudices that underlie This Chapter also contains an interesting section in which Cahill reiterates a point he had earlier made in his Chapter 2 on 'The Ethical Purpose of the Tractatus', viz., that, as he expresses it, 'the Tractatus does not fail in its attempt to lead its reader to a realization about the meaning and value in his life, or in trying to show him how to live, since these were never part of its "ethical aim" in the first place' (Ibid., 86). The subject is Wittgenstein's relationship to religion, which Cahill interprets in terms of the potential it had for him to heal his relationship to the world, a perspective on religious 'belief' which sees it in terms of inner change. This tendency to distance religion from an acceptance of 'truths' about God and the world, and to see it more in terms of a passionate commitment to what is translated in the relevant passage as a 'system of co-ordinates', sometimes as a 'frame of reference' (Ibid., 146), operates with the picture of a 'lost or wretched soul' crying for redemption, a picture which Wittgenstein is evidently applying to himself. The tragedy for Wittgenstein, as Cahill sees him, is that he passionately sought redemption from 'sin' whilst being unable in practice to enter into any of the existing organised 'ways of life', like Christianity, which at least had the potential to fulfill his need (Ibid., 148). The more general philosophical point that Cahill wishes to make about the Tractatus, is that in this book Wittgenstein, as in the Investigations, is concerned with problems which are more narrowly regarded as philosophical, and not with issues pertaining to life or value in a wider sense, given that this is not part of the book's 'ethical' aim: and picture theory of meaning, will not find it particularly easy to engage. This is much less true of the final Chapter already referred to on 'The Fate of Metaphysics', although here as elsewhere in the book one is left with the inevitable feeling that discussions which concentrate on the 'cultural' and 'therapeutic' aspects of Wittgenstein's thinking, can become too far removed from the genuine philosophical difficulties he encounters when he engages with specific problems in his major works. In the final analysis, it is his method of engaging with these problems, and not more generally whether his work has 'cultural' significance, or whether it can in some sense be claimed to be 'therapeutic', in which his true significance as a philosopher really lies. Certainly, this may be said to be only a matter of emphasis, as Cahill has confirmed with his recognition of Wittgenstein as a philosopher who can be seen to be involved in 'the dissolution of philosophical puzzles', almost as if this is a rather unimportant pursuit when compared to his interest in, and reflections upon the culture of his time. There can be no doubt that whilst many of these reflections are profound, some of them do illustrate little more than personal prejudices, e.g., his liking for overview of the book as a whole, and helpfully points the reader in the direction that the book will go on to follow. Five of the remaining six chapters find their origins in earlier papers, with Chapter 2 having three sources, and Chapters 3 -6 inclusive having one source each. Only Chapter One with its discussion of how to interpet the Tractatus, would appear to have been written entirely anew with the intention of consolidating the book's 'resolute' and 'therapeutic' approaches to Wittgenstein's work. Despite their diverse origins, the chapters do fit together fairly well, although there is an inevitable overlap with some amount of repetition. There are times when one is left with the feeling that the text could have been more concise, and this is also true of the book's most distinguishing feature, the 60 pages of Endnotes in close type which make up 25% of its content, and which Cahill mentions by way of apologising for them at the very beginning of his Preface, whilst emphasising the need to qualify, explain, and elaborate upon the main text. This book exhibits surely the most ambitious attempt to date to weld the philosophy and the cultural comments together into a seamless whole (4). It is certainly not for want of trying that in the attempt to unite these disparate elements, the tapestry that Cahill tries extremely hard to weave, has the tendency all too often to come apart at the seams. 
As do most philosophers, Derek

